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Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 43, No. 2, 195-216 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0022009408089029

Undermine, or Bring Them Over: SOE and OSS Plans for Hungary in 1943

Tamás Meszerics

Department of the Central European University, Budapest

Plans for British and American political warfare operations in 1943 diverged considerably. SOE conceptions always involved a sabotage component, while OSS naturally put more emphasis on intelligence requirements. Detaching Hungary from the Axis became a strategic goal almost only by chance. Operational plans were not as fully responsive to shifts in Allied strategy as one might have expected. Assumptions about Allied military presence in the Balkans remained part of the plans far beyond the decisions reached at Quadrant.

Key Words: Hungary • OSS • second world war • SOE • special operations • strategy


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