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Journal of Contemporary History
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‘We Must Push Eastwards!’ The Challenges and Dilemmas of President Benes after Munich

Milan Hauner

University of Wisconsin-Madison

This article has been inspired by the author’s editing of E. BenesMemoirs 1938—45 . One of the strongest challenges for the former Czechoslovak President Benes was the relationship with the Soviet Union. Did Benes, who formed his government in exile in the West, succumb to Stalin’s will during his visit in Moscow in late 1943 or later, during the communist putsch of 1948? The author believes that Benes decision to push eastwards, for the sake of building a closer relationship with Soviet Russia, was formulated much earlier, as a response to the western betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938. However, Benes’ motivation in the process of rebuilding Czechoslovakia was geopolitical rather than ideological, aiming at three objectives: a common border with the USSR (which entailed the sacrifice of Subcarpathian Ruthenia); crushing Slovak autonomy and reinforcing the Czecho-Slovak link; and the transfer of non-Slavic minorities, the Sudeten Germans and Hungarians. Moscow, rather than London or Washington, seemed to have satisfied Benes objectives. This pragmatic dependence on Stalin led also to Benes’ unwavering acceptance of the Soviet version of the Katyn massacre.

Key Words: Benes • Czechoslovakia • Katyn • Ruthenia • Stalin • Sudeten Germans

Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 4, 619-656 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0022009409339435


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